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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Canadian and United States Constitutions are unique among the 
constitutions of the world. Partly written and partly unwritten,
1
 the 
Constitution of Canada traces its beginnings to a British colonial statute.
2
 
Still today, the patriated Constitution of Canada remains a creation of the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom.
3
 The first principle of Canadian 
government is therefore the continuing though nonetheless largely 
ceremonial ubiquity of the Crown.
4
 The Constitution of Canada is also 
something of a structural hybrid: it authorizes judicial review yet 
entrenches a limited mechanism for the legislative branch to effectively 
overrule the Supreme Court.
5
  
The United States Constitution is exceptional in its own right. For 
Alexis de Tocqueville, the Constitution was “the most perfect federal 
constitution that ever existed”.6 It is a rare “example of constitutional 
                                                 
*  Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School; Yale University (J.D., B.A.); Oxford 
University (B.C.L.); Harvard University (LL.M.). My thanks to Jamie Cameron, Ben Berger and 
Sonia Lawrence for their invitation to participate in the Seventeenth Annual Constitutional Cases 
Conference at Osgoode Hall Law School, where I presented an earlier version of this paper on April 11, 
2014. I am grateful to conference participants for their helpful comments and criticisms, and also to 
the peer reviewers who offered valuable suggestions on an earlier draft. 
1  N.A.M. MacKenzie, “The Background of the Canadian Constitution” (1953) 6 Res 
Judicatae 281, at 284. 
2  Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5]. 
3  Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. Canada 
is of course not the only independent state whose Constitution is a creation of the Parliament of the  
United Kingdom. See An Act to constitute the Commonwealth of Australia (U.K.), 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12. 
4  See David E. Smith, The Invisible Crown: The First Principle of Canadian Government 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013). 
5 See Tsvi Kahana, “Canada” in Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro, eds., How Constitutions 
Change: A Comparative Study (Oxford, U.K.: Hart Publishing Ltd., 2011) 9, at 9. 
6  Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1994), 
at 166. 
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superlongevity”,7 having survived uninterrupted since its drafting over 
two centuries ago. Former British Prime Minister William Gladstone 
once called it “the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time 
by the brain and purpose of man”.8 Written, supreme, entrenched, 
supplemented by a bill of rights, and enforced by courts exercising the 
power of judicial review, the United States Constitution set the early 
standard for constitutionalism,
9
 although its influence abroad has 
declined dramatically since its bicentennial.
10
  
Interestingly for constitutional comparativists, the Canadian and 
United States Constitutions share one similarity that sets them apart from 
many of the world’s written constitutions: neither entrenches formal 
unamendability.
11
 Perhaps even more interestingly for Canadian 
constitutional scholars, the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent Senate 
Reference
12
 is inextricably though not expressly connected to the 
unamendability of the Constitution of Canada, even though Canada does 
formally entrench any textually identifiable form of unamendability. 
Formal unamendability is a common design in modern 
constitutions.
13
 Although neither the Canadian nor United States 
Constitution currently entrenches formal unamendability, both entrench a 
peculiar form of unamendability that I have elsewhere called 
constructive unamendability.
14
 Constructive unamendability derives from 
a political climate that makes it unlikely, though not impossible, to 
achieve the requisite supermajorities to pass a formal amendment. It 
therefore results neither from formal constitutional design nor from 
interpretive constitutional law, but rather from constitutional politics. In 
Canada and the United States, the Senate is constructively entrenched 
against formal amendment. This is perhaps no coincidence given that the 
                                                 
7  Zachary Elkins et al., The Endurance of National Constitutions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), at 162. 
8  William E. Gladstone, “Kin Beyond Sea” (1878) 127 North Am. Rev. 179, at 185. 
9  See Stephen Gardbaum, “The Myth and Reality of American Constitutional 
Exceptionalism” (2008) 107 Mich. L. Rev. 391, at 393. 
10  See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, “The Declining Influence of the United States 
Constitution” (2012) 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 762, at 853. 
11  In the United States, the temporarily unamendable Importation and Census-Based 
Taxation Clauses expired in 1808. See U.S. Const., art. V (1789). 
12  Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, 2014 SCC 32 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Senate Reference”]. 
13  See infra, Part II. I am grateful to Tom Ginsburg (Chicago) for sharing with me his data 
from the Comparative Constitutions Project on unamendable constitutional provisions historically 
and currently entrenched in written constitutions. 
14  Richard Albert, “Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V” (2014) 94 
B.U.L. Rev. 1029, at 1042-44.  
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strong federalist motivations for both Constitutions catalyzed the creation 
of a Senate whose design and function was to protect subnational 
interests. While Senate reform in Canada and the United States is 
difficult if not inconceivable precisely because of constructive 
unamendability, other countries have had moderate success in reforming 
their own Senates.
15
 
There is a certain irony in the modern constructive unamendability of 
the Senate of Canada. For much of its history, the Constitution of Canada 
did not entrench a formal amendment rule. Senate reform was not 
possible as a domestic matter without the consent of the Parliament of 
the United Kingdom, which retained the exclusive authority to amend the 
Constitution of Canada.
16
 Yet when Canadian political actors adopted the 
Constitution Act, 1982 and finally entrenched rules authorizing domestic 
institutions to formally amend the Constitution of Canada,
17
 Senate 
reform became no more realizable given the deep divisions that had been  
 
                                                 
15  For example, in the United Kingdom, the House of Lords now restricts membership 
earned on the basis of heredity. See House of Lords Act 1999 (U.K.), 1999, c. 34. Belgium has 
evolved by constitutional amendment from a purely unitary to a fully federal state in which the 
federated entities are represented in the Senate. See Neal Alan Carter, “Complexity as Shock 
Absorber: The Belgian Social Cube” (2002) 8 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 963, at 980-81; Michael 
O’Neill, “Re-Imagining Belgium: New Federalism and the Political Management of Cultural 
Diversity” (1998) 51 Parliamentary Aff. 241, at 254-58; see also Senate Legal Service, The Federal 
Parliament of Belgium, online: <http://senate.be/english/federal_parliament_en.html> (describing 
the changing functions of bicameralism in Belgium from 1831 to 1993, when the most significant 
constitutional changes occurred). The Chilean Senate has been democratized by constitutional 
amendment and is no longer unelected. See Claudio A. Fuentes, “A Matter of the Few: Dynamics of 
Constitutional Change in Chile, 1990-2010” (2011) 89 Tex. L. Rev. 1741, at 1756. The Indonesian 
legislature became bicameral by constitutional amendment. See Kurniawan Hari, “Indonesia to 
Inaugurate Bicameral Legislature” Jakarta Post (October 1, 2004), online: <http://www.the jakartapost. 
com/news/2004/10/01/indonesia-inaugurate-bicameral-legislature.html>. But other efforts to reform 
the Senate have met with failure. For example, a recent referendum to abolish the Irish Senate failed. 
See Shawn Pogatchnik, “Ireland votes against abolishing Senate in referendum, prime minister’s 
plan gets a ‘wallop’” National Post  (October 5, 2013), online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/2013/10/05/  
ireland-votes-against-abolishing-senate-in-referendum-prime-ministers-plan-gets-a-wallop>. In Spain,  
Senate reform appears to have support, but political actors have yet to make significant progress on 
any serious structural proposals, perhaps due to the intractability of the issue. See Elisa Roller, 
“Reforming the Spanish Senate: Mission Impossible?” (2002) 25 West Eur. Pol. 69, at 84-88. 
16  Peter W. Hogg, “Formal Amendment of the Constitution of Canada” (1992) 55 L. & 
Contemp. Probs. 253, at 253 [hereinafter “Hogg, ‘Formal Amendment’”]. There were two 
exceptions. First, provinces were authorized to amend their own provincial constitutions. See 
Constitution Act, 1867, Part VI, s. 92(1) [repealed]. Second, in 1949, the United Kingdom passed an 
amendment authorizing the Parliament of Canada to formally amend the Constitution of Canada in 
relation only to a narrow menu of federal powers. See British North America (No. 2) Act, 1949 
(U.K.), 13 Geo. VI, c. 81. 
17  See Procedure for Amending Constitution of Canada, Part V, ss. 38-49, Constitution Act, 1982. 
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sown by the constitutional negotiations that produced those new formal 
amendment rules. The failure of the 1987 Meech Lake Accord
18
 and the 
1992 Charlottetown Accord
19
 prove how difficult Canada’s new formal 
amendment rules made it then, and still make it today, to formally amend 
the Senate of Canada. 
Faced with the constructive unamendability of the Senate, political 
actors in Canada and the United States may resort to arguably legal though 
illegitimate methods to circumvent the political strictures preventing 
formal amendment. For example, the Equal Suffrage Clause in the  
United States protects a state from any diminishment in its representation in 
the United States Senate without its consent.
20
 For small states, this clause 
was a “constitutional essential” at the founding.21 Without the protection the 
Equal Suffrage Clause afforded them against larger and more populous 
states, small states would have refused to ratify the United States 
Constitution.
22
 The Equal Suffrage Clause is not formally unamendable. But 
the equality of state representation in the Senate has become constructively 
unamendable insofar as no state would freely consent to a diminution of its 
representation in the Senate. Political actors could nonetheless circumvent 
the constructive unamendability of a state’s Senate representation by 
resorting to the strictly legalistic, though substantively illegitimate, double 
amendment strategy, as I will discuss below.
23
 
In Canada, one particular Senate reform at issue in the Senate 
Reference may once arguably have been legal, but it has always been 
illegitimate.
24
 The Government of Canada’s effort to formally amend 
senator selection using the unilateral federal amendment procedure under 
section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982, amounts to an improper 
circumvention of the multilateral general amendment procedure under 
section 38.
25
 In its advisory opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that 
                                                 
18  The 1987 Constitutional Accord, Ottawa, Ontario, June 3, 1987. 
19  Consensus Report on the Constitution: Final Text, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, 
August 28, 1992. 
20  See U.S. Const., art. V (1789) (“Provided that … no State, without its Consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”). 
21  Douglas G. Smith, “An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of 
Confederation and the Constitution” (1997) 34 San Diego L. Rev. 249, at 322. 
22  See Max Farrand, ed., 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1996), at 196, 201 (quoting Roger Sherman).  
23  See infra, section IV.1. 
24  I do not believe that it was legal, and only note that it was “arguably” legal out of respect 
for two of the constitutional experts, Peter Hogg and Warren Newman, who advised the Government 
of Canada in the Senate Reference. 
25  Compare Constitution Act, 1982, s. 44 with ss. 38 and 42.  
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section 44 was not the proper formal amendment procedure to amend 
senator selection,
26
 but reasonable minds can disagree on this point, 
given the debatably permissive language of section 44.
27
 As a strictly 
legalistic matter, therefore, it was arguably once an open question 
whether section 44 could be validly deployed to amend senator selection. 
But, as I will discuss below,
28
 when illuminated by history, context and 
the architecture of Canada’s formal amendment rules, whether section 44 
is the proper procedure to amend senator selection is much less 
debatable.  
In this paper, I illustrate the concept of constructive unamendability 
with reference to senator selection in the Canadian Constitution and the 
Equal Suffrage Clause in the United States Constitution. I evaluate the 
constructive unamendability of the Senate in both countries, I suggest 
that the constructive unamendability of the Senate of Canada has 
compelled Canadian political actors to innovate new methods for 
constitutional change, and I show how Canadian political actors 
attempted to circumvent the Constitution to amend the constructively 
unamendable Senate. Drawing from the late political theorist Georges 
Liet-Veaux’s concept of “fraude à la constitution”,29 I suggest that the 
Government of Canada’s use of section 44 to formally amend senator 
selection may once have been both arguably legal in form yet illegitimate 
in substance. I conclude with brief reflections on the relationship 
between legality and legitimacy.  
II. THE FORMS OF UNAMENDABILITY 
Written constitutions commonly entrench formal amendment rules 
that authorize political actors to change the constitutional text.
30
 In his 
study of amendment difficulty, Donald Lutz illustrates that formal 
amendment rules may range from easy, as in New Zealand, where only a 
simple legislative majority is needed, to extraordinarily difficult, for 
                                                 
26  Senate Reference, supra, note 12, at para. 69. 
27  Constitution Act, 1982, s. 44: “Subject to sections 41 and 42, Parliament may exclusively 
make laws amending the Constitution of Canada in relation to the executive government of Canada 
or the Senate and House of Commons.”  
28  See infra, Section IV.2. 
29  Georges Liet-Veaux, “La ‘fraude à la constitution’: Essai d’une analyse juridique des 
révolutions communautaires récentes: Italie, Allemagne, France” (1943) 59 Revue du droit et de 
science politique en France et à l’Étranger 116, at 145 [hereinafter “Liet-Veaux”]. 
30  See Francesco Giovannoni, “Amendment Rules in Constitutions” (2003) 115 Pub. Choice 
37, at 27. 
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instance in Australia, where national and subnational actors must agree to 
an amendment.
31
 Generally, however, formal amendment involves 
special procedures whose enhanced difficulty as compared to regular 
legislative procedures makes amendment a unique moment in the life of 
a constitutional democracy. 
Perhaps we should take comfort, as Peter Hogg has written, “from 
the fact that it is always difficult to amend a country’s constitution”.32 
Rigidity is a feature not a failing of written constitutionalism insofar as it 
makes a constitution generally more difficult to amend than a law.
33
 
Indeed, the degree of difficulty of formal amendment is partly, as a 
functional matter, what distinguishes constitutional text from ordinary 
law.
34
 Yet constitutional rigidity becomes a defect when formal 
amendment exceeds mere difficulty and becomes an impossibility. One 
scholar suggests that the federalization of constitutional change has made 
formal amendment in Canada “largely impossible”.35 Walter Dellinger, 
one of the leading scholars of constitutional change, has described the 
Constitution of Canada as “unduly rigid”, and observed that “it affords 
little or no possibility of reforming those existing institutions of 
government which play a critical role in the amendment process”.36 The 
difficulty of formal amendment in Canada is exacerbated by judicially 
imposed constraints on formal amendment,
37
 perhaps most notably by 
the Supreme Court’s informal entrenchment of the duty to negotiate in 
                                                 
31  Donald S. Lutz, Principles of Constitutional Design (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), at 170. 
32  Peter W. Hogg, “The Difficulty of Amending the Constitution of Canada” (1993) 31 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 41, at 60. 
33  See Edward Schneier, Crafting Constitutional Democracies: The Politics of Institutional 
Design (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), at 222. 
34  See Donald S. Lutz, “Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment” in Sanford 
Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995) 237, at 240. 
35  Bettina Petersohn, “Constitutional Reform and Federal Dynamics: Causes and Effects” in 
Arthur Benz & Jörg Broschek, eds., Federal Dynamics: Continuity, Change, and the Varieties of 
Federalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 297, at 316. 
36  Walter Dellinger, “The Amending Process in Canada and the United States: A Comparative 
Perspective” (1982) 45 L. & Contemp. Probs. 283, at 300. 
37  Consistent with the Canadian experience, Xenophon Contiades and Alkemene Fotiadou 
observe in their important analysis of constitutional change that “although the role of the judge is 
usually invisible in amending formulas, informal change thrives within surroundings of slow-moving 
formal change”. Xenophon Contiades & Alkemene Fotiadou, “Models of Constitutional Change” in 
Xenophon Contiades, ed., Engineering Constitutional Change: A Comparative Perspective on 
Europe, Canada and the USA (Oxford: Routlege, 2013), at 422. 
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the Secession Reference
38
 as well as the informal entrenchment of its own 
essential features in the recent Nadon Reference.
39
 
Formal amendment in Canada may be difficult but it is not impossible, 
at least not as a result of an express entrenchment of formally 
unamendable constitutional provisions. As I have explained elsewhere, an 
unamendable constitutional provision is “impervious to the constitutional 
amendment procedures enshrined within a constitutional text and immune 
to constitutional change even by the most compelling legislative and 
popular majorities”.40 Constitutional designers entrench unamendable 
provisions for preservative, transformative or reconciliatory purposes
41
 but 
in most cases intend them “to last forever and to serve as an eternal 
constraint on the state and its citizens”;42 hence the phrase eternity clause 
that some scholars have used to describe them.
43
  
Written constitutions entrench a variety of provisions against 
amendment. Germany, for example, makes human dignity unamendable.
44
 
The Algerian,
45
 Brazilian
46
 and Ukrainian
47
 Constitutions make 
unamendable all of their constitutional rights. The Constitution of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina makes unamendable the requirement that the country 
remain or become party to specific international human rights 
agreements.
48
 In Turkey and Togo, secularism is unamendable,
49
 as is 
theocracy in Iran and Afghanistan,
50
 socialism in Cuba,
51
 unitarism in  
 
                                                 
38  See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217,  
at paras. 88-105 (S.C.C.). 
39  See Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, 2014 SCC 21,  
at paras. 90-105 (S.C.C.). 
40  Richard Albert, “Constitutional Handcuffs” (2010) 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 663, at 665-66. 
41  Id., at 678-98. 
42  Id., at 666. 
43  See, e.g., Donald P. Kommers, “German Constitutionalism: A Prolegomenon” (1991) 40 
Emory L.J. 837, at 846; Alexander Somek, “Constitutional Theory as a Problem of Constitutional 
Law” (1998) 32 Isr. L. Rev., at 572 n.19; Manfred Zuleeg, “What Holds a Nation Together? 
Cohesion and Democracy in the United States of America and in the European Union” (1997) 45 
Am. J. Comp. L. 505, at 510.  
44  German Basic Law, Part I, art. 1(1) and at Part VII, art. 79(3) (1949) [hereinafter 
“German Basic Law”].  
45  Algeria Const., Title IV, art. 178 (1996). 
46  Brazil Const., s. VIII, s. II, art. 60, s. 4(IV) (1988). 
47  Ukraine Const., Title XIII, art. 157 (1996). 
48  Bosnia & Herzegovina Const., art. II(7) (1995). 
49  Togo Const., Title XIII, art. 144 (1992); Turkey Const., Part I, art. 4 (1982). 
50  Afghanistan Const., c. X, art. 149 (2004); Iran Const., c. XIV, art. 177 (1980). 
51  Cuba Const., c. XV, art. 137 (1976). 
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Indonesia and Kazakhstan,
52
 monarchism in Jordan and Kuwait,
53
 
republicanism in France, Haiti, and Italy,
54
 the separation of powers in 
Greece,
55
 presidential term limits in El Salvador and Guatemala,
56
 and 
political pluralism in Portugal and Romania.
57
  
Unamendability comes in many forms. Constitutional designers have 
innovated creative mechanisms to formally entrench provisions against 
amendment, political actors have developed effective ways to achieve the 
informal equivalent of formal unamendability, and scholars have advanced 
theoretical arguments about the limits of both formal and informal 
unamendability. Yet we lack a vocabulary to classify comprehensively the 
many forms of unamendability entrenched by constitutional designers, 
interpreted by political actors and theorized by scholars. In this Part, I offer 
a preliminary typology of six major forms of unamendability we may 
perceive in liberal democracies. These forms of unamendability may be 
divided into two primary categories — substantive and procedural — with 
three secondary variations: formal, informal and theoretical. 
This is not the first effort to classify the forms of unamendability. In 
the most important contribution to the study of unamendability, Melissa 
Schwartzberg classifies unamendability along similar though materially 
distinguishable dimensions: temporary and formal.
58
 Schwartzberg’s 
classification turns on two inquiries: whether entrenchment is temporally 
limited or unlimited, and whether it is formally specified or implicitly 
enforced.
59
 This generates a classification of four forms of unamend-
ability: (1) formal, time-unlimited entrenchment; (2) formal, time-limited 
entrenchment; (3) de facto entrenchment; and (4) implicit entrenchment.
60
  
For Schwartzberg, formal, time-unlimited entrenchment refers to a 
textually entrenched constitutional provision that is not subject to a time 
limitation, for instance, Portugal’s absolute entrenchment of republican 
government.
61
 Formal, time-limited entrenchment introduces a temporal 
                                                 
52  Indonesia Const., c. XVI, art. 37, s. 5 (1945); Kazakhstan Const., s. IX, art. 91(2) (1995). 
53  Jordan Const., c. III, art. 126 (1984); Kuwait Const., Part V, art. 175 (1962). 
54  France Const., Title XVI, art. 89 (1958); Haiti Const., Title XIII, art. 284-4 (1987); Italy 
Const., Title VI, s. 2, art. 139 (1948). 
55  Greece Const., Part IV, s. II, art. 110 (1975). 
56  El Salvador Const., Title VI, c. II, arts. 154, 248 (1983); Guatemala Const., Title IV,  
c. III, arts. 187, 281 (1985). 
57  Portugal Const., Part IV, Title II, art. 288(i) (1976); Romania Const., Title VII, art. 152 (1991). 
58
  Melissa Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), at 8-16 [hereinafter “Schwartzberg”]. 
59  Id., at 8. 
60  Id., at 8-16. 
61  Portugal Const., Part IV, Title II, art. 288(b) (1976). 
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wrinkle to textual entrenchment: the absolute entrenchment of a given 
clause or constitutional text expires after a pre-defined period of time. As 
an example, Schwartzberg points to the United States Constitution’s 
temporary entrenchment of the slave trade until 1808.
62
 Under 
Schwartzberg’s classification, de facto entrenchment refers to a textual 
provision that is unamendable despite not being textually entrenched 
against formal amendment and whose “amendment is virtually 
impossible because of exceptionally high procedural barriers to 
change”.63 Finally, implicit entrenchment incorporates the normative 
view that a norm may be so fundamental to the constitutional order that 
its amendment would transform the regime. It also incorporates the 
positive view that a norm has become so deeply embedded as a matter of 
fact that amending it would be unimaginable.
64
 These four forms of 
unamendability illustrate how states may entrench constitutional 
provisions against formal amendment.  
Yet Schwartzberg’s four-part classification may be refined. Instead of 
classifying unamendability along temporal and formal dimensions to 
yield four forms of unamendability, I propose classifying unamendability 
along substantive and procedural dimensions to yield six forms. Like 
Schwartzberg’s classification, the one I propose interrogates whether 
entrenchment is specified in the constitutional text and it also examines 
the duration of the entrenchment. But the classification I propose asks 
additional qualitative questions about entrenchment itself, namely, whether 
formal entrenchment concerns subject matter or procedural unamendability; 
whether informal entrenchment derives from judicial interpretation or 
constitutional theory; and whether informal entrenchment relates to either 
subject matter or procedural unamendability. Below, I illustrate each of these 
with examples. I note, however, that this is a preliminary classification that 
reflects important limitations of its own, as I will explain below.
65
 
1. Substantive Unamendability 
Unamendable provisions often reflect substantive restrictions on 
what is amendable. These restrictions concern the content or subject 
matter of a constitutional rule. For example, a rule that divests political  
 
                                                 
62  U.S. Const., art. V (1789). 
63  Schwartzberg, supra, note 58, at 12. 
64  Id., at 13-14. 
65  See infra, Section II.3. 
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actors of the power to amend a provision guaranteeing republican 
government, secularism or federalism represents a substantive restriction 
on the amending power. Each of these three examples — unamendable 
republicanism, secularism and federalism — is a substantive restriction 
because it limits what may be amended. But identifying what is 
unamendable is only part of the inquiry into substantive unamendability. 
We must also inquire how these substantive restrictions arise to begin 
with. There are three principal possibilities: substantive restrictions may 
be formally entrenched in the constitutional text; they may emerge 
informally; or they may be grounded in constitutional theory. 
Formal substantive unamendability refers to subject matter 
unamendability codified in the text of the constitution. For example, 
under the Italian and French Constitutions, respectively, “the republican 
form [of the state] cannot be a matter of constitutional amendment”66 and 
“the republican form of government cannot be the object of an 
amendment”.67 In contrast, informal substantive unamendability results 
from a binding judicial interpretation by the national court of last resort. 
The best example is the basic structure doctrine developed by the Indian 
Supreme Court. Contrary to the Indian Constitution’s grant of plenary 
formal amendment power to the legislature,
68
 the Court has ruled that 
some amendments are beyond the legislative power: what constitutes the 
“basic structure” of the Indian Constitution is unamendable.69 This “basic 
structure” prohibits amendments to unwritten principles such as federalism 
and secularism.
70
 Finally, theoretical substantive unamendability refers to 
constitutional theories positing that constitutionalism and liberal 
democracy require certain unamendable democratic pre-conditions. In the 
American context, for example, Walter Murphy suggests that human 
dignity is the most fundamental substantive value, and should therefore be 
unamendable,
71
 though neither the constitutional text nor a judicial opinion 
insulates human dignity from formal amendment. 
                                                 
66  Italy Const., Title VI, s. 2, art. 139 (1948). 
67  France Const., Title XVI, art. 89 (1958). 
68  See India Const., Part XX, art. 368 (1950). 
69  Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: The Indian Experience (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), at 197-202. 
70  Vivek Krishnamurthy, “Colonial Cousins: Explaining India and Canada’s Unwritten 
Constitutional Principles” (2009) 34 Yale J. Int’l L. 207, at 208.  
71  Walter F. Murphy, “The Art of Constitutional Interpretation: A Preliminary Showing” in 
M. Judd Harmon, ed., Essays on the Constitution of the United States (Port Washington, NY: 
Kennikat Press, 1978) 131, at 156. 
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2. Procedural Unamendability 
Constitutional provisions may also be unamendable in procedural 
terms. Whereas substantive unamendability entrenches a constitutional 
provision against formal amendment by reference to the content or 
subject matter of the provision, procedural unamendability likewise 
entrenches a constitutional provision against formal amendment but does 
so by reference to the process of formal amendment itself. The three 
variations of substantive unamendability — formal, informal and 
theoretical — apply as well to procedural unamendability: formal 
procedural unamendability, informal procedural unamendability, and 
theoretical procedural unamendability.  
Formal procedural unamendability refers to procedural unamendability 
codified in the constitutional text. For instance, the Mexican Constitution 
effectively makes itself unamendable in the event of rebellion leading to  
its violation, suspension or replacement: “This Constitution shall not lose  
its force and effect even if its observance is interrupted by rebellion. In  
the event that a government whose principles are contrary to those that  
are sanctioned herein should become established as a result of a public 
disturbance, as soon as the people recover their liberty, its observance shall 
be reestablished, and those who had taken part in the government emanating 
from the rebellion, as well as those who cooperated with such persons, shall 
be judged in accordance with this Constitution and the laws that have been 
enacted by virtue thereof.”72 This illustrates formal procedural 
unamendability insofar as the procedural restriction on formal amendment 
— prohibiting formal amendment in connection with rebellion — is codified 
in the constitutional text.  
The second type of procedural unamendability — informal 
procedural unamendability — results from the political process. Informal 
procedural unamendability develops where the procedures required by a 
formal amendment rule are so onerous that political actors cannot 
realistically (though they could theoretically) meet the amendment 
threshold. It reflects procedural unamendability arising informally from 
the dialogic interactions of political actors, in contrast to the textually 
commanded unamendability that characterizes formal procedural 
unamendability. The Articles of Confederation illustrate informal 
procedural unamendability: the 13 states could theoretically satisfy the 
                                                 
72  Mexico Const., Title IX, art. 136 (1917). 
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demanding unanimity threshold for formally amending the Articles,
73
 but 
in practice it was not possible for them to fulfil those procedures.
74
 
Theoretical procedural unamendability is the third type of procedural 
unamendability. Whereas formal and informal procedural unamendability 
refer respectively to procedural restrictions codified in the constitutional text 
and born of the political process, theoretical procedural unamendability 
derives from the distinction between amendment and revision. According to 
constitutional theorists, most notably Carl Schmitt, there is a difference 
between amendment and revision: amendment is possible “only under the 
presupposition that the identity and continuity of the constitution as an 
entirety is preserved”.75 Where a constitutional change adds to, subtracts 
from or alters the constitution in a way that does not “preserve the 
constitution itself”76 but instead transforms its fundamental framework, such 
a change amounts to a revision, not an amendment.
77
 In constitutional 
theory, anything more than simply “fine-tuning what is already in place” 
cannot be achieved by formal amendment.
78
 As a matter of constitutional 
theory, therefore, certain rules, principles, practices and structures are 
unamendable pursuant to the ordinary amendment process, but they may be 
achieved in a more involved process of constitutional revision. This 
procedural distinction illustrates theoretical procedural unamendability. 
3. Temporary Unamendability 
Temporality is best understood as a tertiary variation on 
unamendability. It is neither a primary category — like substantive or 
procedural unamendability — nor a secondary variation such as formal, 
informal or theoretical unamendability. In any given constitutional 
regime, the forms of unamendability may be of either temporary or 
indefinite duration. For example, formal substantive unamendability may 
                                                 
73  Articles of Confederation, art. 13 (1781): “And the articles of this confederation shall be 
inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any 
time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the 
United Sates, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.” 
74  James Madison criticized the Articles of Confederation on these grounds. See “The 
Federalist No. 40” in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University Press, 
1961) [hereinafter “Cooke”] 258, at 263.   
75  Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), at 150. 
76  Id. 
77  Id., at 151. 
78  See Jason Mazzone, “Unamendments” (2005) 90 Iowa L. Rev. 1747, at 1750-52. 
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be entrenched temporarily, as we see in the United States Constitution,
79
 
or indefinitely, as we see in the German Basic Law,
80
 subject of course to 
revision, replacement or revolution.
81
 Likewise, formal procedural 
unamendability may be entrenched temporarily or indefinitely. A 
constitutional text may disable its formal amendment rules on procedural 
grounds for the duration of the regime, which is reflected in the Mexican 
Constitution,
82
 or for a more limited period of time, a strategy the Cape 
Verdean Constitution illustrates by prohibiting formal amendment for 
five years after its coming-into-force.
83
 
Informal substantive and procedural unamendability may similarly 
be temporary or indefinite. A national high court could, for instance, 
interpret the constitution as anchored in inviolable unwritten principles 
that are immune from formal amendment — thereby entrenching 
informal substantive unamendability — but this decision is susceptible to 
refinement or reversal by a successor court. With regard to informal 
procedural unamendability, the political climate that gives rise to 
unamendability need not necessarily be permanent. It may evolve to 
either assuage or exacerbate the social, cultural and economic conditions 
that have generated the political intractability that had given rise to 
informal procedural unamendability to begin with. Theoretical 
substantive and procedural unamendability may also have temporary or 
indefinite variations. Scholars could construct arguments on the merits 
and shortcomings of both temporary and indefinite theoretical 
substantive unamendability, as well as the merits and shortcomings of 
both temporary and indefinite theoretical procedural unamendability. For 
these reasons, I find it analytically useful not to treat temporality as its 
own category of unamendability and instead to view temporality as a 
variation on one of the six forms of unamendability. 
The six-part classification I have suggested exhibits an important 
limitation of its own. The distinction between substance and procedure is 
not as clear as it might seem because substantive restrictions on formal 
                                                 
79  See U.S. Const., art. V (1789) (temporarily entrenching art. I, s. 9, cl. 1 and 4 from 
formal amendment until the year 1808). 
80  See German Basic Law, Part VII, art. 79(3) and Part II, art. 20(1) (1949) (permanently 
entrenching federalism against formal amendment). 
81  Unamendability cannot survive revolution. See Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary 
Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), at 70. Indeed, unamendability may in 
fact provoke revolution. See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund ed., 1982) (1915), at 66. 
82  See supra, Section II.2. 
83  See Cape Verde Const., Part VI, Title III, art. 309(1) (1980). 
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amendment are often cast in procedural terms. Consider again the 
Mexican Constitution, which disables its formal amendment rules as to 
the entire Constitution in the event of rebellion. I have characterized this 
as an example of formal procedural unamendability because it 
entrenches a textual rule invalidating formal amendments made during 
rebellion and does not expressly insulate the subject matter of a 
constitutional provision from formal amendment. Yet we could 
alternatively characterize this prohibition as an example of formal 
substantive unamendability insofar as its actual, though implicit, purpose 
is to protect the content of the Constitution. The substance-process divide 
is thus less definitive than the classification suggests. 
Nonetheless, this classification is modestly useful because it 
complicates our understanding of unamendability. It demonstrates that 
unamendability may be textually entrenched, informally derived or 
abstractly theorized in terms of the content of a provision or principle, or 
in terms of a more generalized restriction on political actors. This 
classification also illustrates that a procedural limitation on formal 
amendment may conceal a substantive prohibition. Finally, this 
classification questions whether temporality should be a dominant 
category in defining the forms of unamendability. The result may be 
more questions than answers, but it brings us closer to understanding 
how unamendability becomes entrenched in a constitutional regime. 
III. CONSTRUCTIVE UNAMENDABILITY 
Neither the Canadian nor the United States Constitution entrenches 
formal substantive or procedural unamendability.
84
 Nor is it clear that 
either regime entrenches informal substantive unamendability, although 
one could argue that the Canadian Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 effectively entrenches it against 
formal amendment.
85
 But both Canada and the United States entrench 
                                                 
84  In the United States, the Importation and Census-Based Taxation Clauses are examples of 
temporary formal substantive unamendability, but those expired in 1808. See U.S. Const., art. V (1789). 
85  Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.J. No. 110, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.). As the Court has 
explained (at para. 25), section 93 “grants to the provinces the power to legislate with regard to 
education”, a grant of authority “subject to certain restrictive conditions, among them s. 93(1) which 
provides that no law may prejudicially affect any right or privilege with respect to denominational 
schools which any class of persons had at the time of Union.” Id., at para. 25. As a result, “[t]he 
effect of this subsection is to entrench constitutionally a special status for such classes of persons, 
granting them rights which are denied to others.” Id. The Court has described s. 93 as “the product of 
an historical compromise which was a crucial step along the road leading to Confederation”, id.,  
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similar forms of informal procedural unamendability.
86
 Informal 
procedural unamendability takes root where the political climate makes it 
practically unimaginable, though nonetheless always theoretically 
possible, to achieve the necessary agreement from political actors to 
entrench a formal amendment. This type of unamendability derives from 
deep divisions among political actors who reach the point of stalemate in 
their dialogic interactions. Under these conditions, formal amendment 
becomes impossible unless constitutional politics somehow manages to 
perform heroics to break the stalemate. The stalemate may itself derive 
from political incompatibilities, unpalatable pre-conditions to formal 
amendment, or a simple unwillingness to entertain thoughts of formal 
amendment despite the constitutional text authorizing the change 
political actors are unwilling to attempt. Alternatively or in addition, the 
stalemate may derive from the structural design of the constitution, for 
instance, a complex horizontal and/or vertical separation of powers that 
creates multiple veto points along the path to formal amendment.  
We may use the term “constructive unamendability” as a shorthand 
for informal procedural unamendability. In law, “constructive” denotes 
an imputed characteristic, one that exists by virtue of a legal fiction 
rather than a legal fact.
87
 It refers to a derivative consequence we may 
infer from a state of affairs that is not legally required but exists as a 
social fact.
88
 A constitutional provision or principle is therefore 
“constructively” unamendable when the constitutional text defines it as 
freely amendable but the political reality demonstrates that it is not. 
Unamendability may be imputed to a provision or principle when 
political actors have expressed their unwillingness or shown their 
inability to satisfy the constitution’s textually mandated procedures to 
formally amend that provision or principle. This constructive 
unamendability need not be an indefinite feature of a provision or 
principle; political circumstances may evolve to alleviate the pressures 
that generated the intractable conditions to begin with, just as an 
uncontentious provision or principle may later become constructively 
unamendable as a result of new political fault lines.  
                                                                                                             
at para. 29, and as a “solemn pact” and “cardinal term” without which there would have been no 
Confederation. Id. Although the Court has not expressly declared s. 93 unamendable, as the Indian 
Supreme Court has done with respect to the basic structure (see supra, Section II.1), the Court has 
suggested that s. 93 merits greater solicitude than other constitutionally entrenched provisions. 
86  Recall that this type of procedural unamendability results from the political process and 
not from a textual command against formal amendment. See supra, Part II.2. 
87  Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (St. Paul, MN: West, 2009), at 356. 
88  See Middleton v. Parke, 3 App.D.C. 149, at 160-61 (1894). 
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Federal democracies may be more vulnerable to producing forms of 
constructive unamendability where a formal amendment targets the 
distribution of powers between the national and subnational states. The 
design of formal amendment rules in federal democracies often serves to 
protect dual interests, and consequently confers veto powers upon both the 
national and subnational for amendments to federalist institutions. Canada 
and the United States are both strong federal democracies whose foremost 
federalist institution — the Senate — is constructively unamendable as a 
result of this shared veto power. Other federal democracies entrench 
formal amendment rules similar to the design of the Equal Suffrage 
Clause, which requires special subnational consent to formally amend a 
state’s representation in the Senate. In Australia, for example, a formal 
amendment to the powers, boundaries or representation of a state requires 
a majority of voters in that affected state to approve the amendment, in 
addition to first securing a simple majority in both houses of the bicameral 
national legislature and securing approval in a national referendum.
89
 
Austria adopts a similar rule for formal amendments to its Federal 
Council.
90
 It is therefore important to observe that federalism may be one 
cause of constructive unamendability. 
1. The Equal Suffrage Clause 
In the United States, the Equal Suffrage Clause is constructively 
unamendable.
91
 The general formal amendment rule requires Congress 
and the states respectively to propose a formal amendment by two-thirds 
vote and to ratify it by three-quarters supermajority.
92
 Under the Equal  
                                                 
89  Australia Const., c. VIII, art. 128 (1900). 
90  See Austria Const., c. II, arts. 26, 34-35, 44 (1920). 
91  Amending the Equal Suffrage Clause may seem unlikely. The clause was entrenched at 
the founding as part of a great compromise deemed crucial to the formation of the Union. See 
Bradford R. Clark, “Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause” (2008) 83 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 1421, at 1430-35. Yet today the Equal Suffrage Clause is not free from scholarly attack. See 
Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), at 50-51. 
The primary point of contention is that senators from smaller states have smaller constituencies  
than those from larger states, effectively giving residents of smaller states greater representation in 
the Senate on the basis of their residency alone. See id., at 50. For example, the seven smallest states 
in the Union, represented by 14 senators, have a combined population of 4.8 million people. Id. The 
4.9 million residents in Michigan, however, are represented in the Senate by only two legislators. Id. 
92  U.S. Const., art. V (1789). The U.S. Constitution also authorizes formal amendment via 
constitutional convention, but this procedure has never been successfully used. See Michael B. Rappaport, 
“Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National Convention Amendment Method and How to 
Fix Them” (2010) 96 Va. L. Rev. 1509, at 1512. Seth Barrett Tillman, “A Textualist Defense of Article I, 
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Suffrage Clause, “no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its 
equal Suffrage in the Senate”.93 The Equal Suffrage Clause therefore 
creates an exception to the general formal amendment rule: a formal 
amendment ordinarily requires Congress and three-quarters of states to 
agree to a formal amendment, but a formal amendment diminishing a 
state’s representation in the Senate — “depriv[ing] [the state] of its equal 
Suffrage in the Senate” — requires in addition the consent of the state 
whose representation in the Senate is changed.
94
 
The Equal Suffrage Clause seems by its terms to require the additional 
consent of only the state deprived of its equal representation in the Senate. 
But it actually requires the unanimous consent of all states.
95
 The reason 
becomes evident when we consider a hypothetical illustration. Assume the 
requisite supermajorities agree by formal amendment to reduce Maine’s 
representation in the Senate. Under the Equal Suffrage Clause, the 
amendment would be invalid without Maine’s consent. Yet all other states 
would likewise be required to consent to the change in their own relative 
Senate representation given their resulting deprivation of “equal Suffrage 
in the Senate”.96 As Sanford Levinson explains, “Vermont’s failure to 
consent to [Maine’s] reduced representation in the Senate would doom the 
proposal, since otherwise one would be foisting an ‘unequal Suffrage’ on 
Vermont, relative to [Maine]’s, without its consent.”97 This unanimity 
requirement highlights what Michael Dorf has referred to as the “near-
impossibility”98 of amending the Senate. 
Observers appear to have conflated the difficulty of formally 
amending the Senate with its absolute unamendability. For instance, the 
Supreme Court of the United States has described the Equal Suffrage 
Clause as a “permanent and unalterable [exception] to the power of 
amendment”.99 Leading constitutional scholars have similarly interpreted 
the clause as formally unamendable: Raoul Berger has described the  
                                                                                                             
Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was 
Wrongly Reasoned” (2005) 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1265, at 1290 n. 64. 
93  U.S. Const., art. V (1789). 
94  “Changing” a state’s representation in the U.S. Senate can mean that the state’s 
representation is either increased or diminished relative to the representation of other states.  
95  Sanford Levinson, “Designing an Amendment Process” in John Ferejohn et al., eds., 
Constitutional Culture and Democratic Rule (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 271, at 284. 
96  See Sanford Levinson, “The Political Implications of Amending Clauses” (1996) 13 
Const. Commentary 107, at 122, note 32. 
97  Id. 
98  Michael C. Dorf, “The Constitution and the Political Community” (2011) 27 Const. 
Commentary 499, at 506. 
99  Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, at 348 (1855). 
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clause as “expressly excepted from the sweep of the amendment 
power”;100 Douglas Bryant has stated that it “may not be altered and is 
forever part of the Constitution”;101 Daryl Levinson has called it 
“explicitly unamendable”;102 Doug Linder has described it as “expressly 
unamendable”;103 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermuele interpret it as 
“entrenched … against subsequent amendment”;104 and Jack Balkin 
deems it “unamendable”.105 These interpretations may reflect either a 
general reference to “unamendability” incorporating its substantive and 
procedural dimensions as well as its formal and informal forms, or they 
may result from a misreading of the clause. In either case, their 
references to unamendability are imprecise. 
We know, however, that the Equal Suffrage Clause does not entrench a 
formally unamendable rule against altering Senate representation. By its 
own terms, the Equal Suffrage Clause makes Senate representation 
amendable provided the concerned state(s) consent to the change. This 
procedural requirement to secure state consent is qualitatively different from 
the wholesale disabling of formal amendment rules resulting from a rule 
imposing formal substantive unamendability. Under formal substantive 
unamendability, the constitutional text prohibits formal amendment under 
that regime even with the unanimous consent of all involved political 
actors.
106
 The German Constitutional Court has enforced the Basic Law’s 
absolute entrenchment of human dignity as a form of formal substantive 
unamendability, recognizing human dignity as “a paramount principle of the 
constitution and the highest constitutional value”.107 The human dignity 
protection, which holds that “human dignity shall be inviolable”108 and is in 
                                                 
100  Raoul Berger, “New Theories of ‘Interpretation’: The Activist Flight from the 
Constitution” (1986) 47 Ohio St. L.J. 1, at 6. 
101  Douglas H. Bryant, “Unorthodox and Paradox: Revising the Ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment” (2002) 53 Ala. L. Rev. 555, at 562. 
102  Daryl J. Levinson, “Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional 
Commitment” (2011) 124 Harv. L. Rev. 657, at 697 n. 128. 
103  Douglas Linder, “What in the Constitution Cannot be Amended?” (1981) 23 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 717, at 717. 
104  Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermuele, “Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal” (2002) 
111 Yale L.J. 1665, at 1681. 
105  Jack M. Balkin, “The Constitution as a Box of Chocolates” (1995) 12 Const. 
Commentary 147, at 149. 
106  Of course, political actors and citizens could alternatively decide to adopt an altogether 
new constitution and thereby create a new constitutional regime. 
107  Donald P. Kommers & Russell A. Miller, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012), at 397 (quoting Aviation 
Security Case (2006), 115 BVerfGE 118, at 152). 
108  German Basic Law, Part I, art. 1(1) (1949). 
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turn formally entrenched against amendment,
109
 is evidently different in kind 
from the Equal Suffrage Clause. 
Some scholars have recognized that the Equal Suffrage Clause is not 
theoretically absolutely unamendable.
110
 Nonetheless, unanimity among 
states is very likely unachievable on most questions in the United States 
and perhaps least probable on amending the Senate. The consequence is 
therefore the same: the Equal Suffrage Clause is unamendable in the 
United States, just as human dignity is unamendable in Germany. But it 
is significant that the vehicle for unamendability in each instance is 
different. In Germany, as in other constitutional states where a provision 
is deliberately entrenched against formal amendment, unamendability is 
an informed choice reflected in the constitutional design of the master 
text. In contrast, the unamendability of the Equal Suffrage Clause derives 
from constitutional politics, not constitutional design. 
2. The Senate in Part V 
In Canada, senator selection is constructively unamendable. Senator 
selection is unamendable under the rules of formal amendment not 
because it is legally unamendable as a matter of constitutional design, but 
rather because political actors cannot realistically expect to assemble the 
constitutionally required supermajorities to formally amend it. To 
understand why senator selection is constructively unamendable, we 
must first understand the structure of formal amendment in Canada, 
specifically its escalating features. 
The defining feature of Canada’s formal amendment rules is its 
escalating structure of formal amendment. The text entrenches five 
distinguishable amendment procedures, each expressly designated for 
amending only specific categories of provisions in the Constitution of 
Canada.
111
 One procedure is devoted exclusively to formally amending a 
provincial constitution. Under this procedure, “the legislature of each 
province may exclusively make laws amending the constitution of the 
province”.112 The other four amendment procedures are cumulative: the 
                                                 
109  Id., Part VII, art. 79(3). 
110  See, e.g., Joel Colon-Rios, “The Three Waves of the Constitutionalism-Democracy 
Debate in the U.S. (and an Invitation to Return to the First)” (2010) 18 Willamette J. Int’l L. & Disp. 
Resol. 1, at 33 n. 110; Elai Katz, “On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of 
Constitutional Entrenchment” (1996) 28 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 251, at 278. 
111  Constitution Act, 1982, Part V. 
112  Id., s. 45. 
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second threshold incorporates the first; the third incorporates the first and 
second; and the fourth incorporates all three.
113
 This framework is 
escalating insofar as the requirements for formal amendment escalate 
incrementally from the first amendment procedure through the fourth. 
The degree of amendment difficulty therefore increases from the first 
through the fourth amendment procedure. That each amendment 
procedure imposes increasingly difficult amendment procedures 
illustrates the defining feature of the escalating structure of formal 
amendment: amendment difficulty rises in proportion to the salience of 
the entrenched provision.
114
 
Of the four escalating amendment procedures, all but the first may be 
initiated by one of three institutions: the House of Commons, the Senate 
or a provincial legislature.
115
 The first amendment procedure is the 
unilateral federal amendment procedure, which does not involve 
provincial legislatures. Under this procedure, the Parliament of Canada 
may on its own formally amend the Constitution “in relation to the 
executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of 
Commons”.116 It may be initiated only by the House of Commons or the 
Senate, and requires the assent of both institutions.
117
 This unilateral 
federal amendment procedure is available for a narrow class of matters 
involving what we can understand as Parliament’s internal 
constitution.
118
 This procedure is further constrained by the restriction 
that it may not be used to amend any matters expressly assigned to 
another amendment procedure.
119
 
The second amendment procedure is the parliamentary-provincial 
amendment procedure. This procedure applies to formal amendments 
that affect “one or more, but not all, provinces”, for instance, an 
amendment concerning boundaries between provinces, the use of English 
or French within a province, or the public funding of provincial religious 
                                                 
113  Id., Part V. 
114  I have discussed elsewhere that this reflects a constitutional hierarchy of values. See 
Richard Albert, “The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules” (2013) 59:2 McGill 
L.J. 225, at 247-51. 
115  Constitution Act, 1982, Part V, s. 46(1). 
116  Id., s. 44. 
117  Id., s. 46(1). 
118  Id. Parliament’s internal constitution includes matters of parliamentary privilege and 
legislative procedure. See Ian Greene, “Constitutional Amendment in Canada and the United States” 
[hereinafter “Greene”] in Stephen L. Newman, ed., Constitutional Politics in Canada and the United 
States (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004) 249, at 251. 
119  Constitution Act, 1982, s. 44. 
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schools.
120
 It requires approval resolutions of both the House of 
Commons and the Senate, and of the provincial legislature or legislatures 
affected by the amendment. The parliamentary-provincial amendment 
procedure incorporates the unilateral federal amendment procedure, 
which requires only the approval of the House of Commons and the 
Senate, and therefore establishes a lower threshold for formal 
amendment. It also applies to matters that are regional in effect rather 
than narrowly tailored to the internal operation of Parliament, and 
therefore of greater constitutional consequence to the country. 
Just as the parliamentary-provincial amendment procedure 
incorporates the unilateral federal amendment procedure, the third 
amendment procedure incorporates the second. The third procedure is the 
default multilateral amendment procedure. It must be used to formally 
amend all parts of the Constitution not otherwise assigned to formal 
amendment by another procedure; it is therefore the Constitution’s 
default amendment formula. This default multilateral amendment 
procedure requires approval resolutions from both houses of Parliament 
in addition to resolutions from the provincial legislatures of at least seven 
of Canada’s 10 provinces.121 It imposes a strict though unconventional 
quorum requirement: the population of the ratifying provinces must 
amount to at least one-half of the total population of all provinces.
122
 
Although it serves as the default amendment procedure, the default 
multilateral amendment procedure is also designated as the exclusive 
amendment procedure for specific items, namely, proportional provincial 
representation in the House of Commons, Senate powers and provincial 
representation, senator selection and eligibility, the Supreme Court of 
Canada, provincial-territorial boundary modification, and the creation of 
new provinces.
123
 The default multilateral amendment procedure 
incorporates the parliamentary-provincial amendment procedure insofar 
as the former requires everything the latter does, but more in addition: a 
provincial supermajority and a quorum. 
The final amendment procedure incorporates all three amendment 
procedures: the unanimity procedure. To formally amend a specifically 
designated class of matters, political actors must use this exacting 
amendment procedure requiring approval resolutions from both the 
House of Commons and the Senate, as well as approval resolutions from 
                                                 
120  Id., s. 43. 
121  Id., s. 38(1). 
122  Id. 
123  Id., s. 42(1). 
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each of the provincial legislatures.
124
 The Constitution requires 
unanimity for five categories of items: the structure and institutions of 
Canada’s constitutional monarchy, namely, the office of the Queen, the 
Governor General and the Lieutenant Governor of a province; the use of 
English or French subject to the amendments made possible through the 
parliamentary-provincial amendment procedure; the composition of the 
Supreme Court of Canada subject to the amendments made possible 
through the default multilateral amendment procedure; a specific ratio of 
provincial representation in the House of Commons to provincial 
representation in the Senate; and the entire structure of the amendment 
rules themselves.
125
 This unanimity procedure imposes a higher threshold 
than the default multilateral amendment procedure. Whereas the latter 
requires the agreement of a significant supermajority of political actors 
involved in the formal amendment process, the former requires their 
unanimous consent. 
Canada’s robust federalism is evident in the escalating structure of its 
amendment rules. It is the varying degree of provincial consent that 
incrementally increases amendment difficulty along the four cumulative 
amendment procedures. Requiring no provincial consent under the 
federal unilateral amendment procedure, but requiring the consent of 
affected provinces under the parliamentary-provincial amendment 
procedure, as well as requiring the consent of a supermajority of 
provinces under the default multilateral amendment procedure, and 
moreover requiring the unanimous consent of provinces under the 
unanimity procedure demonstrates that the escalating structure of formal 
amendment in Canada is anchored in federalism. Three other features of 
Canada’s formal amendment rules reflect the country’s strong federalist 
design: the right to register provincial dissent;
126
 the power to opt out of 
successful amendments and in some cases to receive compensation for 
opting out;
127
 and the right to revoke both provincial dissent and assent.
128
 
It is against this intricate backdrop of escalating and federalist formal 
amendment rules that we must evaluate the formal amendability of 
senator selection. By its terms, the default multilateral amendment 
procedure must be used to formally amend senator selection.
129
 This 
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requires approval resolutions from both houses of Parliament in addition 
to approval resolutions from seven provinces representing one-half of the 
population.
130
 The difficulty, or perhaps even the impossibility, of this 
default multilateral amendment procedure is what makes senator 
selection constructively unamendable. That political actors are required 
to agree broadly and deeply across both levels of government is what 
dooms the prospect of formally amending almost anything using the 
default multilateral amendment procedure, let alone senator selection, 
which is a deeply contested matter of long-standing political and 
historical complexity. 
Scholars have explained why multilateral formal amendment is today 
virtually impossible in Canada. Michael Lusztig’s theory of mass 
input/legitimization argues that significant amendatory change is not 
possible in Canada, though not because of constitutional fatigue brought 
about by recent constitutional failures, but rather because of deep 
structural reasons.
131
 Lusztig points to two problems in particular: first, 
the degree of compromise required by political actors in order to achieve 
constitutional reform is too great, and results in alienating their mass 
supporters; and second, constitutional reform efforts create incentives for 
interest groups to mobilize in order to attain special status and entrench 
that status in the constitutional reform.
132
 As Lusztig explains, “once one 
group is granted special status, it becomes increasingly difficult to deny 
such status to other groups”.133 This suggests why a formal amendment 
on senator selection would not remain a narrowly drawn exercise: it 
would trigger claims by groups demanding constitutional recognition in 
connection with both senator selection and with other constitutional 
matters.
134
 David Cameron and Jacqueline Krikorian state the point well: 
it has become practically and politically impossible to propose an 
amendment on one issue without also responding to “an unmanageable 
range of demands from the country’s other constitutional actors”.135 
Multilateral constitutional amendment in Canada thus engages multiple 
parties on multiple matters involving multiple interest groups, 
culminating in amendment failure. 
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Amendment failure is not likely for all multilateral constitutional 
amendment efforts in Canada. It is likely only where multilateral 
amendment efforts attempt comprehensive constitutional modification, 
which we can understand as an amendment implicating a fundamental or 
constitutive principle of the constitutional community, the polity’s 
constitutional identity, or the framework and interrelations of public 
institutions.
136
 Where a multilateral constitutional amendment concerns 
these matters, failure is likely because political actors and interest groups 
will seek to reduce the level of indeterminacy that the comprehensive 
changes will entail by making demands both on the matter of 
comprehensive modification as well as on collateral constitutional issues 
of importance to them.
137
 The consequence is amending process 
overload, defined “as the inability to achieve successful completion of 
constitutional modification as a result of key actors’ making incompatible 
and intractable demands during the process of constitutional 
negotiation”.138 Modern Canadian constitutional history highlights these 
amendment failures.
139
 
Given the federalist origins of the Constitution of Canada, amending 
senator selection would implicate a fundamental and constitutive 
principle of the polity. Senator selection could therefore not be formally 
amended without comprehensive constitutional modification, which 
would in turn raise the likelihood of amending process overload. The 
consecutive failures of multilateral constitutional amendment since the 
1980s have only made it more difficult to achieve comprehensive 
constitutional modification. As Ronald Watts suggests, “[t]he repeated 
failure to resolve [these constitutional issues] is itself likely to have a 
cumulative effect contributing to increased political contention and 
resentment”.140 Just as the Equal Suffrage Clause is freely amendable 
under the constitutional text yet practically unamendable in light of 
political forces, senator selection is not absolutely entrenched against 
formal amendment under the Constitution of Canada, but the evolution 
of Canadian federalism has made formally amending senator selection 
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under the multilateral general amendment procedure virtually 
inconceivable. The Senate, which is seen as “impervious to formal 
change”,141 is therefore itself an obstacle to meaningful constitutional 
change through Part V.
142
 It may therefore be time, as Clyde Wells has 
suggested, to amend Canada’s formal amendment rules.143 
3. Constitutional Entrenchment and Federalism 
The scope of constructive unamendability may be broad or narrow. In 
the broadest sense, one could describe an entire constitution as 
constructively unamendable. Formally amending the Articles of Confeder-
ation, for example, was described as a “political impossibility”144 because 
the many failures of formal amendment were evidence that “even 
relatively trifling amendment had been proved to be impossible”.145 In 
contrast, constructive unamendability can apply more narrowly to a 
specific constitutional provision or a particular feature of the polity. I apply 
this more narrow sense of constructive unamendability to the Canadian 
Constitution and the United States Constitution inasmuch as the Equal 
Suffrage Clause and senator selection are constructively unamendable. 
Neither the Canadian Constitution nor the United States Constitution is 
generally constructively unamendable; both can be and have been 
amended,
146
 but both are constructively unamendable with relation to a 
particular substantive matter, in each case involving the Senate. 
The constructive unamendability of the Equal Suffrage Clause and 
senator selection highlights the difficulty inherent in distinguishing  
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between substance and procedure in unamendability, as I have discussed 
above.
147
 Although constructive unamendability is synonymous with 
informal procedural unamendability, it is the historical importance of the 
subject matter of both the Equal Suffrage Clause and senator selection 
that has given rise to their unamendability to begin with. What 
complicates our effort to distinguish substance from procedure is that the 
importance of the subject matter — here, the Senate and its protection of 
federalism — is reflected in the heightened procedural difficulty of the 
formal amendment rules required to amend the Equal Suffrage Clause 
and senator selection. We therefore cannot describe the constructive 
unamendability of the Equal Suffrage Clause in the United States or of 
senator selection in Canada as either entirely substantive or entirely 
procedural, but rather as partly both. 
That the Equal Suffrage Clause in the United States and senator 
selection in Canada are constructively unamendable reflects the federalist 
constitutional design in both countries. The centrality of federalism in the 
creation and evolution of the Canadian and United States Constitutions is 
beyond the scope of this modest exposition of constructive 
unamendability. Scholars of law and political science have, in any event, 
explored this point in detail.
148
 What is useful to highlight, however, is 
the influence of the states and the provinces in the design of the Equal 
Suffrage Clause and the rules of senator selection. Although political 
actors in neither instance adopted substantive unamendability, their 
interest was evidently to protect subnational interests in any proposed 
amendment to the Equal Suffrage Clause and senator selection. 
Consider the United States. The Equal Suffrage Clause was 
conceived to safeguard the states against other government institutions, 
both the central government and the other states.
149
 The drafters designed 
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it to be a sovereignty-protecting and enhancing constitutional device.
150
 
At the Philadelphia Convention to draft the new Constitution, the first 
iteration of the Equal Suffrage Clause would have made it substantively 
and indefinitely formally unamendable: Roger Sherman proposed to 
make formally unamendable both equal suffrage and the importation of 
slaves.
151
 The Convention took a vote on Sherman’s proposal, which he 
had formulated as follows: “that no state without its consent be affected 
in its internal police, or deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate”.152 
The proposal did not pass.
153
 Following the defeat of Sherman’s 
proposal, Gouverneur Morris later advanced a follow-up proposal that 
omitted reference to the “internal police” power of states: “that no state, 
without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the 
Senate”.154 The proposal passed without opposition, and today appears in 
the Constitution. Though it is not absolutely entrenched, it has become 
today procedurally inconceivable to amend. 
The Canadian case is more contextual. Until recently, Canada could 
not formally amend its own Constitution. With few exceptions, the power 
of formal amendment belonged to the Parliament of the United Kingdom,
155
 
a power it ultimately surrendered at Canada’s request. Canadian political 
actors struggled to reach agreement on how to formally amend the 
Constitution of Canada on their own without the involvement of the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom. James Hurley has recounted the more 
than one dozen failed efforts to agree on a constitutional design of formal 
amendment rules.
156
 The root of the disagreement concerned the degree 
of provincial consent needed for formal amendment.
157
 In the absence of 
formal amendment rules, political practice had generated conventions 
about the provincial role in formal amendment.
158
 Although provinces 
had been often though not always consulted in formal amendments 
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affecting them, this was only an unwritten practice, not a formalized 
requirement.
159
 Yet, as Peter Hogg observes, “unanimous provincial 
consent had been obtained for all amendments directly affecting 
provincial powers”.160 By the 1960s, political practice had matured into 
what the Favreau Report recognized as a “principle” that the Parliament 
of Canada “will not request an amendment directly affecting federal-
provincial relationships without prior consultation and agreement with 
the provinces”.161  
The principle of provincial agreement to changes affecting federal-
provincial relationships is now entrenched in Canada’s formal 
amendment rules, specifically in the escalating and federalist structure of 
formal amendment in the Constitution Act, 1982.
162
 The default 
multilateral amendment procedure recognizes this principle by requiring 
provincial agreement for formal amendments to five expressly 
designated matters of federal-provincial concern, one of which is senator 
selection,
163
 a matter with obvious implications for federalism. Prior to 
the entrenchment of Canada’s escalating and federalist formal 
amendment rules, an amendment to senator selection would have 
required provincial consultation and agreement under the principle of 
provincial agreement to changes affecting federal-provincial 
relationships. Today the same is true, though the principle has since been 
formalized in the constitutional text. Although senator selection is 
theoretically susceptible to amendment using the default multilateral 
amendment procedure, the current political setting has transformed that 
theoretical possibility into a functional impossibility. 
IV. AMENDING THE UNAMENDABLE 
In our present political climate, formally amending either the Equal 
Suffrage Clause in the United States or senator selection in Canada 
seems inconceivable. Both raise considerable political barriers to 
constitutional change — barriers that are anchored deeply within the 
structure of federalism. In light of the constructive unamendability of the 
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Equal Suffrage Clause in the United States and senator selection in 
Canada, political actors could reasonably presume that their formal 
amendment is impossible. Yet there is in fact a way to formally amend 
both of these constructively unamendable features. The problem, 
however, is that the strategy political actors must adopt in order to 
formally amend either of them within the current constitutional and 
political climate arguably gives rise to what democratic theorist Georges 
Liet-Veaux calls “fraude à la constitution”,164 or in translation fraud upon 
the constitution.
165
 In the United States, formally amending the Equal 
Suffrage Clause would require circumventing its spirit, as I will show 
below.
166
 And in Canada, the Government of Canada’s recent effort to 
formally amend senator selection reflects a similar strategy to circumvent 
the spirit of the Constitution of Canada, as I will also demonstrate 
below.
167
 
For Liet-Veaux, political actors perpetrate constitutional fraud when 
they mask their intent to violate the spirit of the constitution by adhering 
strictly and legalistically to the constitution’s textual rules.168 He worried 
that political actors might respect form while undermining content.
169
 
Political actors could therefore act simultaneously legally and 
illegitimately: it is constitutional fraud for political actors to act legally in 
the formal sense of respecting the written rules for formal amendment 
but illegitimately by undermining the purpose for which those rules have 
been entrenched to begin with. Constitutional fraud is not concerned with 
normatively good or bad outcomes; it can occur in the transition from 
democracy to autocracy, and from autocracy to democracy, or within 
fully democratic or autocratic regimes.
170
 The concept of constitutional 
fraud applies where the legal form is exploited to achieve ends 
inconsistent with the constitutional framework within which those legal 
rules are embedded. 
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1. “Fraude à la Constitution” in the United States 
The constructively unamendable Equal Suffrage Clause is amendable 
using the formalistic approach of constitutional fraud. Consider  
an illustration. Imagine a supermajority of both houses of Congress and  
a majority of political actors in 40 states wish to remove one senator 
from Maine’s congressional delegation, thereby reducing Maine’s 
representation in the Senate relative to other states. Under the Equal 
Suffrage Clause, Maine would have to consent to any diminishment in its 
Senate representation. But imagine Maine refuses to consent. In the face 
of Maine’s objection, it would appear that political actors could not 
proceed with this formal amendment. The Equal Suffrage Clause would 
therefore have fulfilled its purpose: to effectively entrench a form of 
symmetrical federalism where each state is sovereign in its sphere co-
equal with others, and whose autonomy is afforded deference by national 
and state political actors. 
Yet the Equal Suffrage Clause is not itself entrenched against formal 
amendment. Political actors could therefore circumvent its prohibition on 
consentless diminishments of Senate representation by deploying any 
one of Article V’s formal amendment procedures to repeal the Equal 
Suffrage Clause and then to formally amend the Constitution. To return 
to our illustration, the supermajorities in both houses of Congress would 
propose an amendment repealing the Equal Suffrage Clause, and would 
then transmit the proposal to the states for their ratification. To ratify the 
proposal, three-quarters of the states, or 38 in total, must approve. 
Supposing legislative majorities in 40 states support removing one 
senator from Maine’s congressional delegation, the amendment proposal 
would pass, resulting in a formal amendment to Article V removing the 
Equal Suffrage Clause altogether from the Constitution. The next step 
would require the supermajorities in the Congress and the majorities in at 
least 38 states to pass an amendment divesting Maine of one of its 
senators. This two-step formal amendment process would achieve what 
the Equal Suffrage Clause had sought to prevent by requiring Maine to 
consent to the change. 
The double amendment procedure is legal but illegitimate. Even 
Akhil Amar, who concedes that using the procedure would “have 
satisfied the literal text of Article V”, recognizes that it is a “sly 
scheme”.171 Although the double amendment procedure respects the 
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constitutional text, its strict insistence on positivism ignores the implicit 
limits discernible beyond the text’s narrow legalistic prescriptions and 
thereby makes circumventing the constitution possible.
172
 This textual 
subterfuge is, in the words of Walter Murphy, a “sleazy” way around the 
textual constraint the Constitution imposes.
173
 Yaniv Roznai suggests the 
procedure is intolerable as a matter of constitutional theory and should be 
rejected.
174
 The argument is at its strongest in connection with the Equal 
Suffrage Clause, which was designed specifically to prevent the very 
outcome this double amendment procedure would allow. Still, double 
amendment is valid as a strictly legalistic matter, and political actors 
could therefore resort to deploying it as a way to amend the 
unamendable. 
2. “Fraude à la Constitution” in Canada? 
Just as political actors in the United States could argue that the 
constructively unamendable Equal Suffrage Clause is amendable 
pursuant to this purely formalist but illegitimate reading of the United 
States Constitution, political actors in Canada could similarly suggest 
that senator selection is susceptible to formal amendment under a 
similarly legalistic approach that would nonetheless be illegitimate. This 
reflects the strategy the incumbent Government of Canada has followed 
on Senate reform in connection with its use of section 44 to amend 
senator selection. Acting on behalf of the Government, the Minister of 
State for Democratic Reform recently introduced Bill C-7, An Act 
respecting the selection of senators and amending the Constitution Act, 
1867 in respect of Senate term limits,
175
 known as the Senate Reform Act, 
an effort to formally amend senator selection. The Government of 
Canada’s pursuit of Senate reform through Bill C-7 doubled as its 
admission that multilateral formal amendment through section 38 was 
impossible. 
Bill C-7 was the predicate for the Reference to the Supreme Court of 
Canada on Senate Reform. Pursuant to the Supreme Court Act,
176
 the 
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Governor in Council referred six questions to the Supreme Court for its 
opinion on Senate reform generally and on Bill C-7 specifically. The bill 
proposes a framework for provincial and territorial elections to fill 
Senate vacancies. It requires the Prime Minister to consider senatorial 
nominees for recommendation to the Governor General from a list drawn 
up by the province or territory on the basis of an election.
177
 The bill also 
proposes to establish a single nine-year term for senators.
178
 Bill C-7 
therefore seeks to amend the Constitution Act, 1867 in at least two ways. 
First, it expressly proposes to amend the Constitution Act, 1867 by 
imposing term limits where none have existed before.
179
 Second, it 
proposes implicitly to informally amend the Constitution Act, 1867 by 
altering the subsidiary procedures by which the Governor General 
appoints senators. By convention, the Prime Minister currently enjoys 
discretion in selecting whom to recommend to the Governor General for 
a senatorial appointment.
180
 Bill C-7 shrinks the Prime Minister’s 
discretionary authority by requiring that the Prime Minister “must 
consider” those names appearing on provincial or territorial lists.181 
The purported jurisdictional authority for Parliament to pass Bill C-7 
relies on the unilateral federal amendment power in section 44 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.
182
 Under section 44, Parliament may amend  
the Constitution of Canada “[s]ubject to sections 41 and 42 [of the 
Constitution Act, 1982] in relation to the executive government of 
Canada or the Senate and House of Commons”.183 This unilateral federal 
amendment power is best understood as an exception to an exception, 
specifically as an exception to section 41, which is itself an exception to 
section 38. Under section 38, the Constitution of Canada’s default 
multilateral amendment procedure, all parts of the Constitution not 
otherwise assigned to formal amendment by another procedure must be 
amended by approval resolutions from both houses of Parliament as well 
as resolutions from the provincial legislatures of at least seven of 
Canada’s 10 provinces, where the population of the ratifying provinces is 
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at least one-half of the total population.
184
 Section 42 makes this default 
procedure mandatory for specific items, including Senate powers and 
provincial representation as well as Senator selection and eligibility.
185
 
Section 41 operates as an exception to this default rule; it requires 
unanimity — approval resolutions from both the House of Commons and 
the Senate as well as approval resolutions from each of the provincial 
legislatures
186
 — to formally amend five designated categories of items 
including a specific ratio of provincial representation in the House and 
the Senate.
187
 The federal unilateral amendment procedure under section 44 
is an exception to both sections 41 and 42, which qualify section 38. 
Section 44 is a narrow power. It replaced the now-repealed  
section 91(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which gave Parliament 
limited powers of formal amendment.
188
 Today, we understand  
sections 44 and 91(1) as equivalent in the scope of authority they now 
confer (in the case of section 44) or once conferred (in the case of  
section 91(1)) upon Parliament.
189
 The Supreme Court has observed that 
although “s. 91(1) would permit some changes to be made by Parliament 
in respect of the Senate as now constituted, it is not open to Parliament to 
make alterations which would affect the fundamental features, or essential 
characteristics, given to the Senate as a means of ensuring regional and 
provincial representation in the federal legislative process”.190 Matters 
subject to amendment under the federal unilateral power of section 44 — 
matters that would not change the Senate’s “essential characteristics” — 
include parliamentary privilege, legislative procedure and the number of 
Members of Parliament.
191
 Indeed, the three formal amendments effected 
using this procedure reflect the limited scope of section 44.
192
  
In invoking this unilateral federal amendment power to formally 
amend senator selection, the Government of Canada has either 
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misunderstood Parliament’s constitutional authority or attempted to 
achieve unilaterally what it is constitutionally required to pursue 
multilaterally. As referenced above, under section 42 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, a formal amendment to “the method of selecting Senators” 
must be made using the default amendment procedure,
193
 which requires 
approval resolutions from both houses of Parliament in addition to 
approval resolutions from at least seven provinces representing one-half 
of the total population.
194
  
The strongest counter-argument, advanced by the Attorney General 
for Canada, was that senator selection may be amended using section 44 
because “a federal, provincial or territorial consultative process to choose 
potential candidates for Senate appointment is not among the matters 
listed in s. 42”.195 Yet this argument does not reflect the history of formal 
amendment design in Canada, as discussed above,
196
 nor does it respect 
the spirit of both section 42 and section 44. For one, section 42 mandates 
the use of the default procedure for changes to the method of selecting 
senators — the actual choice of one nominee over another — not to the 
manner in which they are procedurally appointed by the Governor 
General. Moreover, section 44, as discussed in this section, is a narrow 
power that cannot be deployed to make prime ministerial discretion-
restricting changes proposed by Bill C-7 or more broadly to change the 
way senators are chosen.  
The Supreme Court’s advisory opinion was consistent with these 
arguments, rejecting the government’s use of section 44 on the basis of 
Canada’s constitutional history, the constitutional text of section 44 in 
comparison with other amendment rules, and the broader architecture of 
the formal amendment rules entrenched in Part V.
197
 
The alternative explanation for the Government of Canada’s choice 
to rely on section 44 instead of the required section 42 does not reflect 
well on the political actors attempting to amend senator selection: they 
intended to act unilaterally in a majority Parliament where the 
Constitution of Canada requires them to cooperate multilaterally through 
federal and provincial institutions. Observers can appreciate why they 
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would choose the unilateral federal amendment procedure over the 
default multilateral amendment procedure. History has shown that it is 
difficult to amend the Constitution of Canada using the default 
multilateral amendment procedure; it has been used successfully only 
once.
198
 Not only is it politically unpalatable to risk near-certain 
amendment failure by deploying section 42 to formally amend one of the 
most contentious institutions in Canadian government, but it entails 
significant political cost even to propose using the default multilateral 
amendment procedure.
199
  
Modern Canadian history has left deep scars on political actors who 
have failed to effect significant reforms via multilateral formal 
amendment.
200
 Lusztig’s model of mass input/legitimization predicts that 
attempts at multilateral formal amendment in Canada are doomed to 
failure.
201
 One can therefore understand why political actors would 
circumvent the default multilateral amendment procedure, if in fact that 
is the reason they chose to rely on section 44 instead of section 42. But 
one can also understand the choice as politically motivated without 
accepting it as constitutionally legitimate. Using section 44 to amend 
senator selection was an effort to perpetrate “fraude à la Constitution”, an 
effort that the Supreme Court wisely ruled unlawful.
202
 
3. Constitutional Amendment by Stealth 
This strategy of intraconstitutional circumvention — operating 
within the constitutional text to invoke as a basis for action one 
entrenched constitutional rule when another is required — appears to be 
one of the two approaches the Government of Canada has taken to 
achieve its Senate reform objectives. The other approach is equally 
problematic as a matter of constitutional law. It may be described as a 
contrasting strategy of extra-constitutional circumvention under which 
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political actors deploy unwritten norms to displace an entrenched 
constitutional rule. It is illustrated by Bill C-20, proposed by the 
Government of Canada in 2007, creating a framework for administering 
consultative elections at the provincial level to identify nominees for 
prime ministerial appointments to the Senate.
203
 The framework 
establishes detailed procedures for running as a candidate,
204
 voting and 
counting ballots in elections,
205
 advertising during the elections,
206
 
financing electoral campaigns,
207
 among others. The Prime Minister has 
himself described Bill C-20 as a “step in fulfilling our commitment to 
make the Senate more effective and more democratic,” and as “creat[ing] 
a process to choose elected senators”.208 The Government of Canada has 
therefore consciously undertaken to materially change senator selection 
with this bill. In the Senate Reference, the Supreme Court repudiated this 
second strategy just as it did the first.
209
 
The Government of Canada’s bid to achieve Senate reform through 
Bill C-20 suggests that it was trying to pursue an unusual method of 
constitutional change: constitutional amendment by stealth. Whereas 
formal amendment ordinarily channels public deliberation through 
transparent and predictable procedures designed to express the informed 
aggregated choices of political and private actors, here on Senate reform 
the Government of Canada chose another route. It appears to have 
calculated that the difficulty of formal amendment in Canada made its 
Senate reform objectives best achievable through opaque and irregular 
procedures designed both to obscure its intention to affect a material 
change to the Constitution of Canada and to convey the impression that 
no such constitutional change is actually occurring. Constitutional 
amendment by stealth occurs when political actors consciously establish 
a new political practice whose repetition is intended to bind successors to 
conform their conduct to it. Over time, this new political practice  
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matures into a constitutional convention which, though unwritten, 
effectively becomes entrenched in the constitution. 
In a forthcoming paper entitled “Constitutional Amendment by 
Stealth”, I theorize this phenomenon using the incumbent Government of 
Canada’s Senate reform efforts as the principal case study. I also show 
that this constitutional reform strategy is reflected elsewhere in the 
Government of Canada’s actions, most notably in its recently developed 
judicial nomination procedures and its more recent rule changes to prime 
ministerial succession. These three changes have so far progressed to 
different stages of political entrenchment: one has grown firmly rooted in 
Canadian political culture; one is established but has not yet been 
invoked; and the other has only recently been proposed and has been 
repudiated by the Supreme Court.
210
 These three changes moreover 
demonstrate the constitutionally questionable strategy of constitutional 
amendment by stealth that Canadian political actors have innovated to 
reshape Canadian political institutions and practices, and indeed the 
Constitution of Canada, without actually formally amending the 
Constitution of Canada. For now, I highlight this forthcoming paper only 
to stress that we have yet to appreciate the extent to which the incumbent 
Government of Canada is committed to reforming the Senate of Canada 
through either formal or informal amendment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between legality and legitimacy is complex.
211
 What 
is legal is not always legitimate, and what is illegal is not always 
illegitimate. The American founding experience is perhaps the best 
expositor of this fascinating duality in law: although the United States 
Constitution was illegal in both its creation and ratification, its 
legitimacy is no longer in doubt.
212
 The illegalities of the Philadelphia 
Convention, and later of the Reconstruction Amendments and the New 
Deal, may be said retrospectively to have been authorized by the 
legitimacy-conferring procedures of higher law-making in which 
American political actors engaged creatively and self-consciously to 
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update the Constitution.
213
 Even the concept of legitimacy itself is 
contestable, or at the very least multifarious in meaning, comprising as it 
does legal, sociological and moral dimensions.
214
 It is therefore 
problematic to presuppose that legality entails legitimacy. 
In this paper, I have argued that the Government of Canada’s effort 
to formally amend senator selection using the unilateral federal 
amendment procedure under section 44 reflects a disjuncture between 
legality and legitimacy. It is undoubtedly legal for the Government of 
Canada to deploy the rules of formal amendment in Part V of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 to formally amend senator selection, and it was 
once arguably legal as a formal matter — before the Supreme Court 
issued its advisory opinion in the Senate Reference — for the 
Government of Canada to use section 44, given that it authorizes 
Parliament to make a formal amendment “to the executive government of 
Canada or the Senate and House of Commons”.215 But the escalating and 
federalist structure of formal amendment entrenched in the architecture 
of Canada’s formal amendment rules suggests that it was illegitimate to 
use section 44 to make a formal amendment to an element of Canadian 
democracy as significant as senator selection. Using the default 
multilateral amendment rule in section 38 is more consistent with 
Canadian history, the evolution of the design of formal amendment rules 
in Canada, and the centrality of federalism to democratic self-
government. That the constitutional text itself states that an amendment 
to “the method of selecting Senators” may be achieved “only in 
accordance with subsection 38(1)”216 only strengthens the point. 
It is no longer a question whether formally amending senator 
selection using section 44 is legal and legitimate. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has repudiated the Government of Canada’s intended use of 
section 44 to effect a fundamental change to the Canadian polity with 
recourse to the federal unilateral amendment procedure in section 44 
instead of the required multilateral amendment procedure in section 38. 
Nevertheless, faced with the constructive unamendability of senator 
selection in Canada, political actors could resort by necessity to 
innovating an unconventional method of constitutional change in order to 
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achieve their desired reforms. The Supreme Court may have levelled the 
most recent blow to the incumbent Government of Canada’s plans to 
amend senator selection, but it is the Canadian electorate that will make 
the final judgment on the legitimacy of Senate reform. In a constitutional 
democracy where political actors are bound by the rules entrenched in a 
written constitution and the norms anchored in unwritten conventions, 
there can be no other way, nor indeed a better one. 
 
